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ZIVOTOFSKY V. KERRY: OF 
PASSPORTS, POLITICS, AND 
FOREIGN POLICY POWERS 
CARA J. GRAND 
INTRODUCTION 
Curiously, throughout the entire history of the United States, our 
government has managed to skirt the necessity to delineate the 
boundaries between Presidential and Congressional powers in regard 
to foreign affairs.1 An absence of explicit constitutional guidelines has 
led to confused reliance upon conflicting extratextual sources, 
ambiguous historical actions, and vague Supreme Court dicta.2 While 
modern scholars seem to have a broad conception of the respective 
foreign affairs powers that the President and Congress should enjoy, 
the failure of the Constitution and the historical record to delineate 
these powers expressly has created complex tensions between these 
two branches.3 Interestingly, Zivotofsky v. Kerry,4 in seeking guidance 
as to the treatment of a city on the other side of the world, brings to 
light this very deficiency in our own constitutional law, and compels 
an imminent determination regarding the division of our nation’s 
foreign affairs powers. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
United States citizen Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky 
(Zivotofsky) was born in Jerusalem in 2002 to Ari Z. and Naomi 
Siegman Zivotofsky, who are also United States citizens.5 The same 
year, Zivotofsky’s mother applied for a United States passport for 
 
 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law 2016. 
 1.  Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky VI), 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 
2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 1873 (Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 13-628). 
 5.  Id. at 203. 
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him, listing his birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.”6 The State 
Department, in compliance with its policy set forth in 7 FAM 1383.5–
6, issued a passport in Zivotofsky’s name listing his birthplace as 
merely “Jerusalem” and omitting any country designation.7 
On September 16, 2003, Zivotofsky’s parents brought suit on his 
behalf against the Secretary of State, seeking, inter alia, declaratory 
relief and a permanent injunction ordering the Secretary to issue 
Zivotofsky a passport listing “Jerusalem, Israel” as his birthplace.8 
They cited section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,9 
which requires the Department of State to list the birthplace of a 
person born in Jerusalem as “Jerusalem, Israel” upon request.10 
Since then, the litigation has been volleyed back and forth within 
the federal court system.11 In 2004, the district court dismissed the case 
on the grounds that Zivotofsky lacked Article III standing and that 
the case concerned a nonjusticiable political question.12 In 2006, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that 
Zivotofsky did have standing to bring suit.13 The D.C. Circuit noted 
that Zivotofsky had amended the injunctive relief he sought, 
requesting that the Secretary record “Israel” rather than “Jerusalem, 
Israel” as his birthplace on his passport.14 It remanded the case to the 
district court so that a more complete record relating to the subjects 
of dispute could be developed.15 
On September 19, 2007, the district court dismissed the suit again, 
determining for the second time that it presented a nonjusticiable 
political question.16 The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that “[b]ecause 
the judiciary has no authority to order the executive branch to change 
the nation’s foreign policy in this matter, this case is nonjusticiable 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 
1350 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 22, and 50 U.S.C.A). 
 10.  Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky I), No. 03-cv-1921, 2004 WL 
5835212, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004). 
 11.  Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 203. 
 12.  Id. (citing Zivotofsky I, No. 03-cv-1921, 2004 WL 5835212, at *4). 
 13.  Id. (citing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky II), 444 F.3d 614 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 14.  Id. (citing Zivotofsky II, 444 F.3d at 616). 
 15.  Id. (citing Zivotofsky II, 444 F.3d at 619–20). 
 16.  Id. (citing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky III), 511 F. Supp. 
2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007)). 
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under the political question doctrine.”17 
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded 
this decision, holding that the case does not present a political 
question.18 The Supreme Court explained that the case did not ask the 
federal courts “to supplant a foreign policy decision of the political 
branches,” but rather, to enforce a specific statutory right.19 Because 
the parties did not dispute the substance of section 214(d), the 
Supreme Court stated that “the only real question for the courts is 
whether the statute is constitutional,” which warrants a determination 
of whether it impermissibly intrudes upon Presidential powers under 
the Constitution.20 The Supreme Court instructed that “[r]esolution of 
Zivotofsky’s claim demands careful examination of the textual, 
structural, and historical evidence put forward by the parties 
regarding the nature of the statute and of the passport and 
recognition powers.”21 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Jerusalem’s history has been a contentious saga of settlers, 
colonists, and pilgrims of diverse origins.22 It has been home to Jews, 
Arabs, and many others with passionate and ancient historical 
claims.23 Fierce political controversy surrounding the city remains 
alive in modern times, as both the state of Israel and the Palestinian 
people claim sovereignty over Jerusalem.24 This political unrest gives 
rise to the legal uncertainty at issue in this case.25 
Eleven minutes after Israel declared independence in 1948, 
President Harry S. Truman recognized it as a foreign sovereign.26 
However, despite the United States’s eagerness to recognize the 
country, Presidents from Truman forward have adopted a policy of 
 
 17.  Id. at 203–04 (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky IV), 
571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
 18.  Id. (citing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky V), 132 S. Ct. 1421 
(2012)). 
 19.  Id. (quoting Zivotofsky V, 132 S. Ct. at 1427). 
 20.  Id. (quoting Zivotofsky V, 132 S. Ct. at 1427–28). 
 21.  Id. (quoting Zivotofsky V, 132 S. Ct. at 1430). 
 22.  SIMON SEBAG MONTEFIORE, JERUSALEM 532 (1st ed. 2012). 
 23.  See id. 
 24.  Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 200. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Understanding of 
Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 804 (2011). 
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strict neutrality regarding sovereignty over Jerusalem.27 The State 
Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) reflects this position of 
neutrality,28 containing a detailed policy regarding the treatment of 
Jerusalem.29 Among its many components, this FAM policy provides 
that for an applicant born in Jerusalem, “[d]o not write Israel or 
Jordan” on his passport, as Israel “[d]oes not include Jerusalem . . . .”30 
As such, the State Department is obligated to record “Jerusalem” 
rather than “Jerusalem, Israel” or “Israel” as the place of birth on the 
passports of applicants born in Jerusalem after 1948.31 
Over the last two decades, Congress has pushed back against the 
executive policy of netrality, endeavoring to recognize Jerusalem as 
falling within the sovereignty of Israel.32 In 1995, it enacted the 
Jerusalem Embassy Act, which states that “Jerusalem should be 
recognized as the capital of the State of Israel” and that “the United 
States Embassy in Israel should be established in Jerusalem.”33 The 
Department of Justice and the Secretary of State at the time 
vehemently opposed this act, claiming the Act would impermissibly 
intrude upon the President’s exclusive power to recognize foreign 
nations and would severely impair the success of Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations.34 Congress ultimately enacted the legislation with a 
waiver provision authorizing the President to suspend the funding 
restriction for six-month periods in the interest of national security.35 
On September 30, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act.36 Section 214(d), the provision 
at issue, provides: 
(d) RECORD OF PLACE OF BIRTH AS ISRAEL FOR 
PASSPORT PURPOSES. —For purposes of the registration of 
birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a 
United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary 
 
 27.  Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 200. 
 28.  Id. at 201.   
 29.  Id. (citing U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANAUAL § 1383.6(a)) 
[hereinafter FAM]. 
 30.  Id. (citing 7 FAM 1383 Ex. 1383.1 pt. II). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. (quoting Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 3(a)–(b), 109 Stat. 
398, 399 (1995)). 
 34.  Id. at 201–02 (citing 164 CONG. REC. S15, 463, 468 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995)). 
 35.  Id. at 202 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-45, 109 Stat. at 400). 
 36.  Id. (citing Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 
116 Stat. 1350 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 22, and 50 U.S.C.A)). 
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shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, 
record the place of birth as Israel.37 
The President issued a signing statement with the Act, warning 
that it contained provisions which impermissibly interfere with the 
President’s constitutional powers regarding foreign affairs.38 It stated 
that section 214(d) specifically, if construed as mandatory rather than 
advisory, would interfere with the President’s constitutional authority 
to decide the terms upon which to recognize foreign nations.39 
III.  HOLDING 
The D.C. Circuit first framed the case with Justice Jackson’s well-
adopted tripartite framework in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,40 under which the court evaluates the President’s powers to 
act based upon the level of congressional acquiescence.41 The court 
restated: 
First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum . . . .” 
Second, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon 
his own independent powers. . . .” Third, “[w]hen the President 
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only 
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter.”42 
The court noted that both parties agree that the present case falls 
into the Youngstown framework’s third category, requiring a 
determination of whether the recognition power, when at its “lowest 
ebb,” authorizes the Secretary to decline to enforce section 214(d).43 
Following the Supreme Court’s instruction, the D.C. Circuit then 
began the analysis of the separation of powers question with a careful 
examination of the “textual, structural, and historical” evidence.44 It 
acknowledged that “[n]either the text of the Constitution nor 
 
 37.  Id. (quoting Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 116 Stat. at 1366). 
 38.  Id. (quoting Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1698, 2002 WL 31161653, at *1–2 (Sept. 30, 2002)). 
 39.  Id. (citing Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2002 WL 
31161653, at *1– 2). 
 40.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 41.  Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d 197, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 42.  Id. at 204–05 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37). 
 43.  Id. at 205. 
 44.  Id. at 205–06 (quoting Zivotofsky V, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012)) 
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originalist evidence provides much help in answering the question of 
the scope of the President’s recognition power.”45 The court discussed 
the ambiguities within the “receive ambassadors” clause of the 
Constitution and Federalist No. 69, and suggested that the omission of 
references to an exclusive presidential recognition power was likely 
due to the founders’ greater concern with whether foreign nations 
would recognize the United States than with how the United States 
would recognize foreign nations.46 
The court then considered post-ratification history, which, the 
court explained, supports the Secretary’s position that the President 
holds the recognition power exclusively.47 It cited a number of 
historical examples in which the President acted unilaterally or in 
which the legislative branch deferred to the President on matters of 
foreign recognition.48 In addition, the court considered Supreme 
Court dicta in some cases in which the President’s stance on foreign 
recognition was declared binding upon the judiciary, and other cases 
indicating that the President could exercise the recognition power 
without the consent of the Senate.49 
After concluding that the President holds the recognition power 
exclusively, the court then considered whether section 214(d) 
impermissibly intrudes upon that exclusive recognition power.50 It 
stated that Congress does not have exclusive control over passport 
matters, because the executive branch has retained the power to 
intervene when issues of national security and foreign policy are 
implicated.51 The President’s recognition power, it explained, “includes 
the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of 
recognition,”52 and reiterated the Secretary’s arguments that section 
214(d) “runs headlong into a carefully calibrated and longstanding 
executive branch policy of neutrality toward Jerusalem.”53  The court 
concluded by affirming the district court’s judgment dismissing the 
complaint on the alternative ground that section 214(d) infringes 
upon the President’s exclusive recognition power and is thus 
 
 45.  Id. at 206. 
 46.  Id. at 206–07 (citations omitted). 
 47.  Id. at 207. 
 48.  Id. at 207–10 (citations omitted). 
 49.  Id. at 211–13 (citations omitted). 
 50.  Id. at 214. 
 51.  Id. at 215 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 295 (1981)). 
 52.  Id. at 216 (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942)). 
 53.  Id. 
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unconstitutional.54 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Zivotofsky’s Arguments 
Zivotofsky argues that section 214(d) is well within Congress’s 
passport powers, and even if it were not, it does not intrude upon any 
exclusive presidential powers.55 
1.  Section 214(d) is Appropriate Passport Legislation 
Zivotofsky argues that 214(d) is permissible passport legislation 
falling well-within the confines of Congress’s passport powers.56 
Congress has dealt frequently with the subject of passports, and the 
Supreme Court has looked to Congress’s legislation in resolving 
passport issues even when they affect significant foreign policy 
concerns.57 
Zivotofsky cites the fact that, in 1994, Congress directed the 
Secretary of State to permit United States citizens born in Taiwan to 
list “Taiwan” as their place of birth on their passports, despite the fact 
that the United States did not recognize Taiwan as a foreign state.58 
The State Department responded by issuing a formal policy 
declaration stating that its “one-China” policy had not changed 
despite the new passport legislation.59 This, Zivotofsky asserts, 
demonstrates that 214(d) may be implemented while maintaining the 
executive branch’s recognition policy on Jerusalem.60 
Zivotofsky also notes that the Supreme Court has consistently 
limited the President’s power over passport matters to the authority 
conferred to him by statute.61 He cites Zemel v. Rusk,62 in which the 
President was “statutorily authorized to refuse to validate passports 
of United States citizens for travel to Cuba[,]” and Haig v. Agee,63 in 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Brief for the Petitioner at 16–17, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628 (U.S. Jul. 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner]. 
 56.  Id. at 19. 
 57.  Id. at 20–21 (citations omitted). 
 58.  Id. at 12, 21–22 (citing State Department Authorization Technical Corrections Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-415, 108 Stat. 4299 (1994)).  
 59.  Id. at 13, 22 (citation omitted). 
 60.  Id. at 22. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 63.  Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
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which the Secretary of State could revoke the passport of a citizen 
causing serious damage to United States foreign policy because “the 
statute authorize[d] the action[.]”64 Zivotofsky emphasizes that such 
precedents demonstrate that the President may not nullify Congress’s 
directive in passport legislation merely by asserting a foreign policy 
concern.65 
Furthermore, Zivotofsky asserts that even if foreign policy 
concerns were sufficient to provide the executive with the authority to 
interfere with Congress’s passport powers, the State Department’s 
place-of-birth rules do not constitute a rational recognition policy.66 
The Foreign Affairs Manual permits “Taiwan,” “Gaza Strip,” “West 
Bank,” and “Palestine” to be recorded as places of birth, despite the 
fact that the United States has never recognized any of these regions 
as foreign sovereigns.67 Therefore, the simple recording of a region as 
a place of birth cannot be tantamount to a formal recognition of 
sovereignty.68 
In addition, Zivotofsky highlights that Congress frequently 
legislates in areas affecting foreign policy.69 For example, Congress 
creates immigration legislation, which the Supreme Court has 
recognized “can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic 
relations for the entire Nation . . . .”70 In addition, Congress exercises its 
constitutional powers to regulate foreign commerce and 
appropriations.71 The executive has never disregarded or refused to 
enforce any such legislation on the grounds that it interferes with the 
conduct of the nation’s foreign policy.72 
2.  Section 214(d) does not Infringe an Exclusive Presidential 
Power 
Zivotofsky argues that neither the Constitution nor post-
ratification history support the existence of any exclusive presidential 
recognition power.73 He explains that the original understanding of 
 
 64.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 22–24 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 3; Haig, 
453 U.S. at 289). 
 65.  Id. at 24. 
 66.  Id. at 25. 
 67.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. at 26. 
 70.  Id. (quoting Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (emphasis added)). 
 71.  Id. at 27. 
 72.  Id. at 26–27. 
 73.  Id. at 27–28. 
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the “receive ambassadors clause” in Article II, Section 3 of the 
Constitution did not give the president exclusive authority to 
recognize foreign sovereigns.74 Instead, Alexander Hamilton referred 
to it in The Federalist No. 69 as “more of a matter of dignity than 
authority[.]”75 Even if the “receive ambassadors clause” did vest an 
implied recognition power in the President, it was certainly not 
exclusive, because other means of recognizing foreign governments, 
such as creating treaties or appointing ambassadors, require Senate 
approval.76 In addition, Congress has exercised recognition power 
under its war and foreign affairs authority.77 
Zivotofsky further claims that Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
opinion for the Court in 1818’s United States v. Palmer, 78 as well as 
other Supreme Court decisions, have described a shared recognition 
authority.79 In Palmer, a piracy prosecution, the Court held: 
[W]hen civil war rages in a foreign nation, one part of which 
separates itself from the old established government, and erects 
itself into a distinct government, the courts of the union must view 
such newly constituted government as it is viewed by the legislative 
and executive departments of the government of the United States.80 
Additionally, the constitutional law treatises of William Rawle and 
Joseph Story state that the legislature has superior recognition power, 
and may declare its dissent from executive recognition or 
acknowledge the sovereignty of another nation that the executive has 
refused to acknowledge.81 Further yet, Zivotofsky asserts that post-
ratification history does not support the existence of an exclusive 
executive recognition power, and cites to a number of examples in 
which recognition decisions were apparently made by Congress, or in 
which the President implemented a recognition decision in 
conjunction with Congress.82 
 
 74.  Id. at 28. 
 75.  Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 76.  Id. at 29. 
 77.  Id. at 30. 
 78.  United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818). 
 79.  Id. at 30. 
 80.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 30–31 (quoting Palmer, 16 U.S. at 643 
(emphasis added)). 
 81.  Id. at 32–33 (citing WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 96 (Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) and 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1560 (1833)). 
 82.  Id. at 34, 57. 
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3.  Dicta in the Supreme Court’s Opinions does not Concern 
Disagreement between Congress and the President 
Zivotofsky also points out that, despite the D.C. Circuit’s emphasis 
upon Supreme Court dicta in rendering its decision, no Supreme 
Court case, in dicta or otherwise, has ever addressed whether 
recognition power is exclusive to the President or shared with 
Congress.83 In fact, the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue 
presented by Zivotofsky’s case, in which the executive acts contrarily 
to a Congressional enactment.84 
4.  Enforcement of 214(d) Will Have Negligible Impact on 
American Foreign Policy 
Lastly, Zivotofsky asserts that because the enforcement of section 
214(d) would have only a negligible impact upon foreign policy, there 
are not strong enough grounds for the executive to override Congress 
when the executive’s power is at its lowest ebb.85 He explains that, 
with the exception of persons born in Jerusalem, the State 
Department has applied the place-of-birth requirement flexibly to 
accommodate the personal ideologies of passport holders in virtually 
all instances, including in regard to Palestinian-American passport 
holders.86 Section 214(d) would affect only a potential 50,000 
Jerusalem-born Americans, and despite Palestinian perception, would 
not actually have the effect of changing United States policy 
regarding Jerusalem.87 
B.  Secretary Kerry Arguments 
Secretary of State John Kerry argues that the nation should speak 
with one voice in deciding whether to recognize foreign nations, and 
that this one voice belongs to the executive branch.88 He asserts that 
this exclusive presidential recognition power is derived from the 
Constitution.89 Furthermore, he contends that section 214(d) 
constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment upon this exclusive 
 
 83.  Id. at 58. 
 84.  Id. at 59. 
 85.  Id. at 63–64. 
 86.  Id. at 63. 
 87.  Id. at 63–64. 
 88.  Brief for the Respondent at 9, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628 (U.S. Sep. 22, 2014) 
[hereinafter Brief for the Respondent]. 
 89.  Id. 
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presidential recognition power.90 
1.  The Constitution Grants the President Exclusive Power to 
Recognize Foreign States 
The Secretary asserts that the primary source of the President’s 
recognition power comes from Article II’s grant of authority to the 
President alone to “receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers.”91 He explains that this authority must include the power to 
decide whether to establish diplomatic relations with a foreign entity.92 
Because establishing diplomatic relations with a foreign entity entails 
treating the entity as a state, the recognition power is vested solely in 
the President.93 He cites George Washington’s decision to receive 
Edmond Genet, minister of the new government of France, which 
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson warned would constitute 
an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of this government.94 
Kerry explains that the President’s recognition power is further 
grounded in the Constitution’s assignment of the bulk of foreign 
affairs powers to the President.95 He points out that, in a move away 
from the Articles of Confederation’s assignment of foreign relations 
solely to Congress, the Constitution designates the executive as “the 
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations.”96 It provides the President with the power to nominate 
ambassadors and to make treaties, which constitute recognition 
decisions.97 
Moreover, Kerry asserts that structural and functional 
considerations confirm that the President’s recognition power is 
exclusive.98 The Constitution, he claims, contains no provision for 
Congress to make, or even participate in, recognition decisions.99 
 
 90.  Id. at 11. 
 91.  Id. at 13 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 92.  Id. at 13–14. 
 93.  Id. at 14 (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1560, at 415–16 (1833)). 
 94.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 95.  Id. at 16. 
 96.  Id. at 17–18 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 
(1936)). 
 97.  Id. at 18 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
 98.  Id. at 22. 
 99.  Id. (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1560, at 417 (1833) (“The [C]onstitution has expressly invested the executive with 
power to receive ambassadors, and other ministers. It has not expressly invested [C]ongress with 
the power, either to repudiate or acknowledge them.”)). 
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Because recognition decisions require careful judgments about 
whether the state or government exists and controls a particular 
territory, and how recognition would affect United States foreign 
relations, the executive is far better positioned than Congress to make 
such decisions.100A shared arrangement would create friction between 
the branches and uncertainty, preventing the nation from responding 
to international events with clarity and decisiveness.101 
Kerry asserts that from the Washington administration to the 
present, Presidents have made hundreds of recognition decisions 
unilaterally.102 In addition, the Secretary contends that the President’s 
recognition power has always been understood to include the 
authority to determine the territorial boundaries of a foreign state.103 
These determinations, he explains, often have national security 
implications.104 He claims that Congress has repeatedly acquiesced to 
the President’s recognition power, citing, for example, the House’s 
failed 1864 attempt to pass a resolution acknowledging the Emperor 
of Mexico, and the Senate’s abandoned 1896 attempt to create a joint 
resolution recognizing the independence of Cuba.105 Kerry asserts that 
Zivotofsky’s attempts to demonstrate that Congress has exercised 
recognition power are unavailing, because in each instance, 
Congress’s actions were consistent with recognition determinations 
already made by the President.106 
Kerry further contends that the Supreme Court and individual 
Justices have repeatedly stated that the executive has sole authority to 
make recognition decisions.107 In 1817, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting 
as a Circuit Justice, declined to recognize Buenos Aires because the 
executive had never recognized it.108 In 1838, Justice Story, also while 
sitting as a Circuit Justice, wrote, “[i]t is very clear, that it belongs 
exclusively to the executive department of our government to 
 
 100.  Id. at 23 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (the President “has his confidential 
sources of information” and “his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other 
officials.”)). 
 101.  Id. at 25–26. 
 102.  Id. at 27. 
 103.  Id. at 29. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. at 31–33 (citations omitted). 
 106.  Id. at 36. 
 107.  Id. at 39. 
 108.  Id. at 39–40 (quoting United States v. Hutchings, 26 F. Cas. 440, 442 (C.C.D. Va. 
1817)). 
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recognise, from time to time, any new governments.”109 Kerry cites a 
number of Supreme Court precedents, which he states, reaffirm this 
point.110 He explains that the reason that these precedents do not 
specifically address a congressional attempt to constrain the 
President’s recognition power is that Congress has historically 
acquiesced to the President.111 
2.  Section 214(d) Unconstitutionally Interferes with the 
President’s Exclusive Recognition Power 
Kerry asserts that section 214(d) impermissibly requires the 
executive, upon request by individual citizens, to treat Jerusalem as 
within Israeli sovereignty in issuing United States passports, which are 
official documents addressed to foreign sovereigns.112 Because 
passports constitute a form of diplomatic communication, the 
executive has long used its inherent constitutional recognition 
authority in regard to the content of passports to ensure that 
birthplace designations conform to the President’s recognition 
decisions.113 
The Secretary further asserts that Congress has historically 
acknowledged the executive’s broad authority over the content and 
use of passports.114 Congress has exercised its powers over foreign 
commerce and border control by enacting statutes requiring passports 
for certain travel, limiting particular persons’ travel, and prohibiting 
application fraud and passport tampering.115 None of these statutes 
purport to regulate passports’ content, much less content relating to 
foreign relations matters.116 
Kerry argues that section 214(d) unconstitutionally encroaches 
upon the President’s recognition authority by requiring him to 
contradict his recognition position regarding Jerusalem in official 
communications with foreign sovereigns.117 He explains that the 
decision of how to describe place of birth necessarily operates as an 
official statement of the United States’s recognition policy for that 
 
 109.  Id. at 40 (quoting Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 29 F. Cas. 1402, 1404 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1838)). 
 110.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 42. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 46. 
 115.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 116.  Id. at 47. 
 117.  Id. at 48. 
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particular area.118 Section 214(d), Kerry explains, would alter the 
executive’s policy toward Jerusalem by forcing it to issue passports 
acknowledging Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem.119 Finally, Kerry 
argues that the D.C. Circuit’s decision was correct even in light of the 
Youngstown framework, because despite the President’s diminished 
power when acting contrarily to the will of Congress, Congress’s will 
lacks legality here because it impermissibly intrudes upon the 
President’s exclusive recognition power.120 
V.  ANALYSIS 
While the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate conclusion that section 214(d) 
impermissibly encraoches on executive prerogative might have a basis 
in constitutional intent, the opinion itself falls short of justifying such 
an impactful ruling. The court quickly glazed over the issue of 
whether section 214(d) constitutes an actual foreign recognition 
policy decision, and in doing so, failed to properly consider a 
significant threshold issue which seems taken for granted without 
adequate support. In addition, the court relied upon erroneous 
grounds for finding the existence of an exclusive executive 
recognition power, taking into account the Secretary’s weak 
arguments for a constitutional foundation and improperly relying 
upon irrelevant dicta. 
A.  The D.C. Circuit did not State Sufficient Grounds to Determine 
that a Place-of-Birth Passport Designation Constitutes an Official 
Recognition Decision 
The question of whether a foreign policy determination made by 
Congress impermissibly encroaches upon a Presidential power need 
not be reached if, in fact, section 214(d) is not making a foreign policy 
determination. Indeed, neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Secretary of 
State have articulated sufficient grounds for concluding that a 
passport’s place of birth designation constitutes an official foreign 




 118.  Id. at 49. 
 119.  Id. at 52. 
 120.  Id. at 58 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 
(1952)).  
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As support for its determination that section 214(d) is a foreign 
policy decision, the D.C. Circuit cited to both the title and legislative 
history of section 214 in its entirety.121 However, as Zivotofsky 
explains, the other subsections pertain to the location of the United 
States embassy in Israel, a topic separate from that of passport 
designations.122 Supreme Court precedent indicates that the 
constitutionality of one subsection of a statute should be determined 
separately from that of the other provisions.123 In addition, Zivotofsky 
notes that the Supreme Court’s ruling in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius124 establishes that Congress’s 
characterization of a law does not necessarily control its 
constitutionality.125 
Moreover, the State Department itself does not definitively assert 
that the provision at issue is a policy determination. For example, the 
Secretary explained in interrogatories that 214(d) is unconstitutional 
because the executive does not “engag[e] in official actions that would 
recognize, or might be perceived as constituting recognition of, 
Jerusalem . . . .”126 The fact that the provision merely “might be 
perceived as constituting recognition” can hardly be tantamount to an 
official foreign recognition decision that would have the force of 
amending an executive foreign policy. As Zivotofsky notes, the State 
Department’s rejection of the provision apparently rests upon the 
concern that Palestinians may mistakenly interpret it as a dramatic 
reversal of United States foreign policy.127 This concern in itself 
necessarily includes the admission that the provision would not 
actually constitute a reversal of foreign policy. The Secretary provides 
no support for the contention that allaying fears about the 
 
 121. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d 197, 217–18 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
 122.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 19. 
 123.  See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) 
(“[W]e agree with the Government that the unconstitutional tenure provisions are severable 
from the remainder of the statute.”); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 
U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006) (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a 
statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer . . . to enjoin only the 
unconstitutional applications . . . while leaving other applications in force.”).  
 124.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94 (2012) (holding that, 
despite Congress’s assertions that minimum coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act was 
a “penalty” authorized under the Commerce Clause, the Court could find find congressional  
authority under the taxing power instead because the Court’s “plain duty” is to adopt an 
interpretation “which will save the Act”) (citation omitted)). 
 125.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 20 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94). 
 126.  Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 200 (citation omitted). 
 127.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 63 (citation omitted). 
GRAND 2.3.15 - FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  11:23 AM 
54 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 10 
amendment of a United States foreign policy is a necessary means of 
maintaining the policy. 
The Secretary also does little to reconcile its past treatment of 
other disputed territories in regard to passports with its current 
treatment of Jerusalem. Instead, he baldly asserts that the 
Department’s policy prohibits “listing a country whose sovereignty 
over the relevant territory the United States does not recognize.”128 As 
Zivotofsky points out, the Foreign Affairs manual permits the listing 
of such territories as “Taiwan” and “Palestine” as places of birth on 
passports despite the fact that the United States has never recognized 
these territories as foreign sovereigns.129 The Secretary attempts to 
explain this away with the assertions that the Department allows a 
“city or area” to be listed for disputed territories, and that listing 
“Taiwan” is consistent with United States policy, which recognizes 
Taiwan as a mere part of China.130 However, to some, Taiwan is a 
country and a sovereign. Would not listing “Taiwan” as a place of birth 
on a passport then essentially acknowledge a country’s sovereignity 
over territory that the United States has never officially recognized? 
Apparently the State Department did acknowledge this as a 
concern, because it issued a foreign policy declaration accompanying 
the Taiwan legislation stating that its policy toward Taiwan had not 
changed.131 Why then, as Zivotofsky suggests, could the State 
Department not comply with section 214(d), which, albeit for slightly 
different political reasons, would also have the effect of listing a 
country whose sovereignty over the territory the United States does 
not recognize, while similarly issuing a foreign policy declaration 
clarifying that the United States recognition policy toward Jerusalem 
had not changed?132 It seems that such special treatment of Jerusalem 
warrants stronger justification from the Secretary should he be 
permitted to reject section 214(d). 
 
 
 128.  Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 22, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628 (U.S. 
Feb. 21, 2014). 
 129.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 25. 
 130.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 50–51. 
 131.  See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 13 (“State Department cable 299832, sent 
on November 5, 1994 . . . added, ‘The U.S. recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China as the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledges the Chinese position that 
there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of China.’”). 
 132.  Id. at 22. 
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B.  There is an Insufficient Basis for Concluding that Executive 
Recognition Power is Exclusive 
Even if the Supreme Court does find sufficient basis to conclude 
that section 214(d) constitutes an amendment to United States 
foreign recognition policy toward Jerusalem, there is currently a 
dearth of evidence demonstrating that the executive has broad 
exclusive authority to set foreign recognition policy, and as such, that 
section 214(d) would violate separation of powers. 
While Secretary Kerry never asserts that there is any explicit 
foundation for an exclusive presidential recognition power in the 
Constitution, he continues to argue that the “primary source” of this 
power is the “receive ambassadors” clause of Article II.133 He explains 
that because the President’s exclusive power to receive an 
ambassador includes the power to decide whether to establish 
diplomatic relations with that ambassador’s countries of origin, “the 
recognition power is vested solely in the President.”134 This argument 
is logically flawed, because it incorrectly assumes that receiving 
ambassadors is the only means of recognizing a foreign nation. Kerry 
himself seems to admit this later on in the same argument, when he 
explains, “[s]imilarly, the President has the power to ‘make Treaties’ 
with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . in a manner that fully 
accords with his recognition policy.”135 Here, the Secretary appears to 
acknowledge another form of recognition decision, while 
simultaneously admitting that the President cannot act unilaterally in 
implementing it. 
The Secretary’s principal remaining arguments for exclusive 
executive recognition power are that Congress is not equipped to 
handle recognition decisions,136 and that several Supreme Court 
justices has spoken to this effect.137 These arguments are tenuous at 
best. While the many historical examples he cites of early 
 
 133.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 13 (citation omitted). 
 134.  Id. at 13–14 (emphasis added). 
 135.  Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
 136.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 22–23. 
 137.  Respondent’s references to Supreme Court Justice’s decisions while sitting in Circuit 
courts (Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 39–40) carry little, if any, weight. See United 
States v. Price, 50 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1850) (noting that although Justice Story’s decision while 
sitting in Circuit court was “entitled to high respect[,]” it “is not binding in its authority upon 
this court”). In addition, in Hutchings, the court concluded only that the judiciary could not 
recognize the independence of a foreign nation. See United States v. Hutchings, 26 F. Cas. 440, 
442 (C.C.D. Va. 1817) (observing that “it was not competent to the court” to pronounce the 
independence of Buenos Aires, which the executive “had never recognized”). 
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constitutional interpretations make a strong case that the President 
does have some inherent foreign recognition power,138 they fail to 
establish that this power is exclusive. In addition, by criticizing 
Zivotofsky’s position because “the Constitution’s text prescribes no 
role for the Congress in recognition decisions,” the Secretary places a 
higher burden upon Zivotofsky than upon himself, because he does 
not allege any explicit constitutional support for his argument either. 
The D.C. Circuit, which ultimately sided with the Secretary, did 
acknowledge that “[n]either the text of the Constitution nor 
originalist evidence provides much help in answering the question of 
the scope of the President’s recognition power.”139 However, it 
adopted the Secretary’s interpretations of early post-ratification 
historical examples, which do nothing to elucidate the full range of the 
executive’s recognition power.140 As Professor Robert Reinstein has 
noted, every post-ratification example the D.C. Circuit cited for an 
exclusive recognition power either proved only that the executive has 
some non-exclusive recognition power, or even that executive power 
is subordinate to congressional recognition power.141 As such, if the 
Supreme Court does declare an exclusive Presidential foreign 
recognition power, it will need to draw upon stronger constitutional 
grounds than the Secretary’s constitutional arguments provide. 
In rendering its decision, the D.C. Circuit also relied heavily upon 
Supreme Court dicta, explaining that “carefully considered language 
of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be 
treated as authoritative[.]”142 Despite admitting that the Supreme 
Court has never held that the President holds exclusive recognition 
authority, it claimed that Supreme Court has stated such in dicta.143 
However, the court’s reliance upon dicta was misplaced. As Judge 
Tatel noted in his concurrence, neither party, nor any of the amici, 
have been able to point to a time in our history when the President 
 
 138.  See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 20–21. 
 139.  Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d 197, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 140.  See id. at 207–10 (“Beginning with the administration of our first President, George 
Washington, the Executive has believed that it has the exclusive power to recognize foreign 
nations”). 
 141. Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Separation of Powers—D.C. Circuit Holds That 
Recognition of Foreign Governments Is an Exclusive Executive Power.— Zivotofsky v. Secretary 
of State, 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 2154, 2160 (2014) (citing Robert J. 
Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2013)). 
 142.  Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 212 (citation omitted). 
 143.  Id. 
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and Congress have clashed over an issue of recognition.144 As such, 
none of the cases the court cited provided any insight as to the scope 
of the President’s recognition authority within the third category of 
the Youngstown framework.145 
In fact, of the six Supreme Court opinions that the D.C. Circuit 
cited, five never stated, even in dicta, that the President’s recognition 
power is exclusive and thus not subject to any contrary acts of 
Congress.146 Five of the cases merely asserted the dominance of the 
President’s recognition power over the judiciary, while another 
explained only that the President could implement recognition 
decisions in the absence of the Senate’s advice and consent.147 In using 
this erroneously interpreted dicta as its primary basis for reaching the 
conclusion that the President holds exclusive recognition authority, 
the court skirted a necessary discussion regarding where the 
separation of power actually lies between the executive and 
legislative branches when it comes to foreign recognition decisions.148 
C.  Likely Disposition 
The Supreme Court’s repeated use of the Youngstown framework, 
including in its recent Medellin v. Texas149 decision, strongly suggests 
that it will apply the framework in this case. This means that it will 
likely evaluate whether or not historical evidence supports an 
exclusive presidential recognition authority strongly enough to 
overcome Congress’s will when the President’s power is “at its lowest 
ebb.”150 As the Secretary correctly notes, this likely can be done if 
section 214(d) is found to constitute legislation beyond the outer 
bounds of Congress’s constitutional authority.151 Whether the Supreme 
Court will reach this holding is somewhat unclear in light of the 
notable absence of precedent illuminating this particular tension 
between the legislative and executive branches. 
 
 144.  Id. at 222. 
 145.  Constitutional Law, supra note 141, at 2159. 
 146.  Id. at 2161 (citations omitted). 
 147.  Id. at 2161–62 (citations omitted). 
 148.  Id. at 2162. 
 149.  Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1350 (2008) (“Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite 
scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”). 
 150.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952). 
 151.  See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 58 (“Contrary to the amici House 
Members’ argument . . . holding Section 214(d) unconstitutional would not suggest that 
Congress’s proper exercise of its enumerated powers cannot touch on subjects that relate to 
recognition.”). 
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On the one hand, no Supreme Court dicta appear to strongly 
support the concept of an exclusive presidential recognition power 
beyond the reach of congressional intervention. The “sole organ” 
dictum upon which the D.C. Circuit largely relied has been historically 
misinterpreted.152 In making the original statement, evidence suggests 
that Chief Justice Marshall was discussing only the President’s power 
to execute a treaty absent congressional instruction.153 He never 
claimed exclusive executive recognition power, but rather, supported 
Congress’s ability to intervene in foreign policy matters.154 Moreover, 
other Supreme Court dicta appear to contradict the theory of 
exclusive executive recognition authority, stating “Congress and the 
President share . . . [recognition] power.”155 
However, the Court may ultimately be persuaded by existing 
scholarly arguments favoring a broad reading of the President’s 
authority over matters concerning diplomacy.156 Such arguments 
explain that the President enjoys a “residual” foreign affairs power 
under Article II, Section 1’s grant of the “executive Power[,]”, and 
that leading political writers of the founding era, including Locke, 
Montesquieu, and Blackstone, expressed that the executive power 
included broad foreign affairs powers.157 In addition, the explicit 
allocations of some foreign affairs powers to other government 
bodies, such as the power to declare war to Congress, may constitute 
evidence of the outer bounds of the President’s foreign affairs 
authority, which may otherwise be all-encompassing.158 
CONCLUSION 
Zivotofsky presents a unique dilemma to the Supreme Court in 
that it will force it to define, for the first time, the boundaries of 
legislative and executive power in matters of foreign recognition. 
Ambiguities in dicta and a stark absence of analogous historical 
examples will prevent the Court from drawing upon the security of 
well-established precedent and venerated pillars of constitutional 
 
 152.  Constitutional Law, supra note 141, at 2160–61. 
 153.  Id. at 2161. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  See id. at 2162 (citations omitted); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 59 
(citations omitted). 
 156.  See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over 
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001). 
 157.  Id. at 234. 
 158.  Id. at 235. 
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interpretation. Instead, the Supreme Court will have to fulfill its 
ultimate role in examining what relationship, if any, the Constitution 
envisioned between these two branches in regard to foreign affairs, 
and what historical practice has suggested the future should hold for 
the implementation of so many crucial United States recognition 
decisions. 
 
